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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW YORK PRACTICE
Parent's negligent supervision of a child not a tort.
Although Gelbman v. Gelbman220 appeared to have eliminated
intrafamily immunity, 221 whether an action could be maintained
against a parent for negligent supervision of a child - a question
one would expect to arise as a result of such elimination - was not,
until recently, reexamined by the Court of Appeals. Confronted
with a defendant seeking contribution from the mother of an
injured plaintiff,222 the Court of Appeals, in Holodook v. Spencer,223
was finally required to resolve any uncertainty, 224 since as the
Court noted, application of the Dole principles prevented the grant-
ing of relief unless the first-party plaintiff, the injured child, had a
cause of action against the third-party defendant, his mother.225
In Holodook226 the infant plaintiff had "darted out from be-
tween parked cars and was struck by an automobile driven by
defendant. ' 227 Defendant, maintaining that the parent had negli-
gently failed to supervise the infant, sought to have the plaintiffs
mother share responsibility for the infant's injuries.228 Speaking
through Judge Rabin, the Court noted that negligent supervision
was not, as a historical matter, civilly actionable in New York229
and held that it "should not now be recognized as a tort .... ",30
A number of compelling arguments were set forth in support
of the Court's position. Allowing a nonparent defendant to obtain
Dole apportionment from a parent, the Court feared, might dis-
220 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969).
221 See 33 ALBANY L. REv. 438 (1969); 19 CATH. U.L. REv. 113 (1969); 44 NOTRE DAME
LAw. 1001 (1969); 15 N.Y.L.F. 419 (1969). But see 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 127 (1969).
222 The defendant's claim for contribution was based upon Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30
N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972). For an extended discussion of Dole
by Professor David D. Siegel, see 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3019, commentary at 231-304
(1974).
223 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1974), affg 43 App. Div. 2d 129,
350 N.Y.S.2d 199 (3d Dep't 1973).
224 For a brief analysis of Holodook at the appellate division level, see The Suvey, 48 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 611, 650 (1974).
225 36 N.Y.2d at 51, 324 N.E.2d at 346, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 872.
22 6Holodook was decided with two companion cases concerning negligent supervision:
Graney v. Graney, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1974), wherein a father
was sued by his infant through a guardian ad litem; and Ryan v. Fahey, id., wherein the
mother was sued by her infant through his father.22 7 Id. at 42, 324 N.E.2d at 341, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 864.
2 2 8 Id.
229Id. at 45, 324 N.E.2d at 343, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 867. In Ciani v. Ciani, 127 Misc. 304,
215 N.Y.S. 767 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1926), decided before intrafamily immunity was an
established doctrine in New York, see Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, 248 N.Y. 626, 162 N.E. 551
(1928) (per curiam), the Supreme Court, Albany County, had held that in a suit by an infant
plaintiff against his father "the plaintiff has no cause of action." 127 Misc. at 307, 215 N.Y.S.
at 770.
230 36 N.Y.2d at 45, 324 N.E.2d at 343, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 867.
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courage parents from prosecuting their children's legitimate
claims. Should parents who pursue their children's legal remedies
be held liable under Dole, economic hardship and emotional strain
might weaken the family relationship. 231 The Court was also con-
cerned with the difficulties inherent in applying a reasonable man
standard to parental supervision of children.232 To impose such a
standard, the Court noted, "would be to circumscribe the wide
range of discretion a parent ought to have in permitting his child
to undertake responsibility and gain independence. ' 233 Finally, the
rationale behind eliminating intrafamily immunity was held in-
applicable to Holodook. Although if a duty be owed to the entire
world "the law will not withhold its sanctions merely because the
parties are parent and child, '234 the Court reasoned that the duty
to supervise and protect one's child arises solely from the family
relationship and is not owed to the world at large.235
The conclusion reached in Holodook seems to be a desirable
one. 23 6 Had the Court allowed recovery, an unreasonably heavy
23,Id. at 46-47, 324 N.E.2d at 344, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 868, citing 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR
3019, commentary at 246 (1974). But see Petersen v. City and County of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii
484, 462 P.2d 1007 (1970), wherein the Supreme Court of Hawaii, in eliminating intrafamily
immunity and holding that a child may sue his parent for the latter's negligent supervision,
said that the disruption of family harmony caused by a lawsuit, the very reason for having
immunity, is no longer a valid consideration where a wrong has already been committed.
232 36 N.Y.2d at 50, 324 N.E.2d at 346, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 870-71.233 Id., 324 N.E.2d at 346, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 871.
234 Id.
23. Id. at 50-51, 324 N.E.2d at 346, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 871. It should be noted, however,
that a cause of action will lie against a parent if, through that parent's negligence, his child
causes injury to a third party. Id. at 45, 324 N.E.2d at 343, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 866; Stasky v.
Bernardon, 81 Misc. 2d 1067, 367 N.Y.S.2d 449 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1975); Lampman
v. Cairo Cent. School Dist., 81 Misc. 2d 395, 366 N.Y.S.2d 579 (Sup. Ct. Greene County
1975).
Another argument postulated in Holodook was based on N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 3-111
(McKinney 1964), which mandates that the contributory negligence of a parent not be
imputed to an infant seeking to recover damages for personal injury. If a parent were
subjected to a Dole claim, the infant plaintiffs award, contrary to the policy inherent in
§ 3-111, would likely be reduced because, in most cases, the parenes contribution would be
taken out of the award that the child had received from the first-party defendant. 36 N.Y.2d
at 48-49, 324 N.E.2d at 345, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 869-70. But, as Judge Jasen noted in his
dissent, id. at 53, 324 N.E.2d at 347, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 873, this argument is not convincing in
light of CPLR 1206 which provides that
any property to which an infant . . . is entitled, after deducting any expenses
allowed by the court, shall be distributed to the guardian of his property ... to be
held for the use and benefit of such infant ....
236 Three departments of the appellate division had previously held that negligent
supervision was not a tort. See Lastowski v. Norge Coin-O-Matic, 44 App. Div. 2d 127, 355
N.Y.S.2d 432 (2d Dep't 1974); Ryan v. Fahey, 43 App. Div. 2d 429, 352 N.Y.S.2d 283 (4th
Dep't), aff'd sub nom. Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859
(1974); Graney v. Graney, 43 App. Div. 2d 207, 350 N.Y.S.2d 207 (3d'Dep't 1973), affd sub
nom. Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 NE.2d 338, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1974);
Holodook v. Spencer, 43 App. Div. 2d 129, 350 N.Y.S.2d 199 (3d Dep't 1973), aff'd, 36
N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1974).
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burden would have been placed upon parents,2 3 7 who, in order to
protect themselves from onerous judgments, may have been en-
couraged to become overly protective towards their children, giv-
ing rise to possibly harmful psychological consequences. In addi-
tion, by establishing a policy against increasing parental burdens,
the Court recognized the difficulties encountered in raising chil-
dren, the special and individual relationship between parent and
child, into which, it was noted, "[c]ourts and [l]egislatures... have
intruded only minimally .. "238 and the fact that external sanc-
tions alone will not assure performance of family obligations.239
Although the decision is well reasoned, there is one potential
drawback: in establishing what appears to be an absolute rule, the
Court has failed to consider cases in which parental misconduct
may be so great as to warrant tort liability. Under facts which show,
for example, that a parent's activities have so departed from the
norms of accepted conduct as to give rise to criminal culpability, 240
it would appear anomalous to preclude civil liability. The better
course would be to limit Holodook to situations not involving grossly
negligent supervision.
As a result of Holodook, the abolition of intrafamily immunity
in New York, once thought absolute,241 has been limited to "non-
willful torts between parent and child 'for acts which if done by one
ordinary person to another would be torts.' "242 The precise impli-
cations of this language and the extent to which the Holodook
rationale can be relied upon in other factual settings has yet to be
resolved.
217 See 36 N.Y.2d at 45, 324 N.E.2d at 343, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 867.2 38 1d. at 50, 324 N.E.2d at 346, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 871.
23 9 !d.
240 It is a violation of N.Y. PENAL LAv § 260.10(2) (McKinney 1975) for a parent to fail
to "exercise reasonable diligence" to prevent his child from becoming a "neglected child" as
defined in the Family Court Act. A neglected child includes one whose physical condition
has been impaired by his parent's failure "to exercise a minimum degree of care . . . in
providing the child with proper supervision .... " N.Y. FAMILY CT. AcT § 1012(f)(i)(B)
(McKinney Supp. 1974). That gross negligence is required to support liability under
§ 260.10(2) is made dear by an examination of article 15 of the Penal Law dealing with
culpability. To be liable under § 260.10(2), a culpable mental state ii iequired. See N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 15.15(2) (McKinney 1975). Of the four exclusive culpable mental states set
forth in the Penal Law, ia. § 15.00(6), criminal negligence, id. § 15.05(4), which requires that
the misconduct constitute "a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable
person would observe in the situation," id., would appear to be the only logical culpable
mental state applicable to the conduct proscribed by § 260.10(2).
241 See note 221 supra.
242 36 N.Y.2d at 44, 324 N.E.2d at 342, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 865, quoting McCurdy, Torts
Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L. REv. 1030 (1930). Indeed, the Holodook
Court noted that Gelbrman, see note 220 and accompanying text supra, had relaxed the
intrafamily immunity doctrine. 36 N.Y.2d at 47, 324 N.E.2d at 344, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 868.
Obviously, relaxing a doctrine is quite different from abolishing it.
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